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Since Keynes (1936) compared investor behavior in stock markets to a beauty contest, the 
question has been asked whether extrinsic information, such as animal spirits or sunspots 
may affect agents’ behavior. Starting with Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), and Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983) a rich theoretical literature has explored the influence of animal 
spirits or sunspots on economic activities.1 In settings with multiple equilibria, agents may 
condition their actions on publicly observable but intrinsically uninformative signals (sun-
spots). Consequently, such signals may serve as focal points for agents’ beliefs, and these 
beliefs may become self-fulfilling giving rise to sunspot equilibria. This literature intro-
duced a fruitful approach to model aggregate fluctuations and shifts in sentiments that are 
often hard to rationalize because they frequently occur without apparent changes in eco-
nomic fundamentals.  
Equilibrium multiplicity arises in many macroeconomic models as they often entail 
strategic complementarities arising from technology externalities, market imperfections, 
search frictions or incomplete information (see e.g., Cooper and John, 1988)2. As a conse-
quence, these frictions can, for example, introduce sunspot equilibria into business cycle 
models (e.g., Christiano and Harrison, 1999, Jaimovich, 2007, or Benhabib and Wang, 2013). 
Similarly, strategic complementarities play a key role in models of bank runs (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983), speculative attacks (Obstfeld, 1996, Morris and Shin, 1998), and other crises 
phenomena that have been associated with coordination failure. While in all of these envi-
ronments, sunspots can theoretically cause aggregate fluctuations, there is little empirical 
evidence beyond anecdotes.3   
Central banks may exploit the existence of sunspot equilibria by guiding expecta-
tions through announcements or forecasts that are not backed by any interventions and 
thus can be interpreted as extrinsic information. A current example is the discussion about 
forward guidance. The zero lower bound on interest rates introduces multiple steady state 
equilibria in monetary macro models with active monetary policy (Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe 2002). An implication is that an economy stuck in a liquidity trap can, the-
oretically, jump towards the steady state with target inflation provided that inflationary 
expectations switch to the target rate. This has led several scholars to suggest that central 
                                                     
1 Keynes used the term “animal spirits” to explain fluctuations in investor behavior, whereas the term sunspot origi-
nated in the work of William Jevons (1884), who proposed a relationship between sun activity (i.e., the number of 
sunspots) and the business cycle. In the theoretical literature, the term “sunspot” is a synonym for extrinsic random 
variables, i.e., variables that may influence economic behavior, but are unrelated to fundamentals such as payoffs, 
preferences, technologies, or endowments. For a modern account of a possible relationship between business-cycle 
fluctuations and sunspots see Farmer (1999).  
2 In monetary macro models, equilibrium multiplicity may also arise from price-level indeterminacy, as transversali-
ty conditions in DSGE models are often not fundamentally justified (Cochrane, 2011). 
3 An example is Mario Draghi’s famous statement that the European Central Bank “is ready to do whatever it takes 
to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough” (ECB, 2012). It is widely believed that these words staved 
off the speculation about a break-up of the Euro-area in 2012.  
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banks should provide forward guidance by announcing inflation forecasts in order to lead 
the economy out of a liquidity trap. Delphic forward guidance relies on market expectations 
following the announced forecasts and “presumably improves macroeconomic outcomes by 
reducing private decisionmakers’ uncertainty” (Campbell et al. 2012, p.2). Delphic forward 
guidance does not directly affect macroeconomic fundamentals.4 In fact, its success hinges 
on agents’ expectations about other agents responses. It is an open question whether and 
how central banks can guide agents’ expectations from one equilibrium to another by 
providing focal points for private sector forecasts. The mere existence of multiple equilibria 
also raises the question, whether non-official extrinsic information (like newspapers or 
opinions from popular market participants) may affect market sentiments and move the 
economy to a different equilibrium or may affect the impact of central-bank announce-
ments.   
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to test the potential effects of extrinsic 
signals, and explicitly focus on how such signals affect subjects’ ability to coordinate their 
behavior. We are particularly interested in analyzing how the likelihood for observing sun-
spot-driven behavior depends on the degree of publicity of extrinsic signals and how the 
effects of extrinsic public announcements are influenced by co-existing idiosyncratic (pri-
vate) signals.5 This allows us to provide a comprehensive picture of the potential impact of 
sunspots on equilibrium selection. 
In the field, arguably it is hard to identify a particular extrinsic event (sunspot) that 
may affect agents’ choices. Even if such an event is identified, it is difficult to establish cau-
sality between the extrinsic event and an economic outcome.6 Benhabib and Wang (2015), 
for example, show how asset prices driven by sunspot equilibria may be misinterpreted as a 
random walk in an efficient market driven by fundamentals. Relatedly, while some studies 
argue that self-fulfilling beliefs may have played a role in explaining major recessions (e.g., 
Chauvet and Guo, 2003), others rule out that professional forecasts were a source of output 
fluctuations (e.g., Choy et al., 2006). Laboratory experiments, instead, offer a controlled en-
vironment that permits a systematic exploration of the impact that extrinsic information 
                                                     
4 Odyssean forward guidance, instead, is accompanied by a history-dependent policy commitment to keep interest 
rates low even if this is suboptimal from a forward-looking perspective (Eggertson and Woodford, 2003). Odyssean 
forward guidance contains information about future policy and should thus be seen as intrinsic information.  
5 Throughout this paper, we call an agent’s strategy “sunspot-driven” if the agent’s actions depend on extrinsic sig-
nals. 
6 A recent empirical literature in financial economics explores, for example, the impact of sport events on stock mar-
ket indices (Edmans, Garcia and Norli, 2007), of weather conditions on mood and subsequently on investment deci-
sion (see, e.g., Yuan, Zheng and Zhu, 2006; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2007, and references therein) or more gener-
ally on expectations about future economic situation (Dohmen et al., 2006). Similarly, confidence indices, such as 
the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, Ifo Business Climate Index or Survey of Professional Forecasters may 
have an influence on growth (e.g., Enders, Kleemann, Müller, 2014). However, it is difficult to argue that these 
events or conditions have no direct effects on utility.   
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has on economic behavior.7 While a few experimental studies, in particular Duffy and Fisher 
(2005), provide evidence that extrinsic random signals may indeed affect subjects’ behavior 
after some training, little is known about the stochastic properties of extrinsic signals re-
quired for generating sunspot-driven behavior.  
In our experiment, two randomly-matched subjects simultaneously pick a number 
from the interval [0,100]. They maximize their payoffs by choosing the same number, while 
deviations are punished with a quadratic loss function. Each coordinated number selection 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium and payoffs do not depend upon the number that players 
coordinate on. However, picking “50” provides a natural focal point in the absence of a co-
ordination device, as it minimizes the risk stemming from strategic uncertainty.8 This game 
nicely captures Keynes’ beauty contest metaphor and thus emphasizes the role of higher-
order beliefs for subjects’ behavior. It can be considered as a reduced form of a macro mod-
el with self-fulfilling prophecies, in which two professional forecasters predict the inflation 
rate, and the resulting inflation rate will be determined by the average forecast. 
The extrinsic signals (sunspots) are binary random variables unrelated to payoffs, 
with realizations being either 0 or 100. These signals have four properties that we exploit. 
First, signals are semantically meaningful as they clearly map to the action space.9 Second, 
the signal structure allows us to easily vary the likelihood that players receive the same sig-
nal and therefore we are able to identify necessary stochastic conditions for generating 
sunspot-driven behavior. Third, the signals are extreme in the sense that they point to-
wards the lowest or highest possible action, which maximizes the tension between the sig-
nals and the risk minimum as focal points. Finally, equilibria can be ordered by risk-
dominance, which enables us to measure the power of sunspots by how distant actions are 
from 50.  
We find that sunspot-driven behavior does not require priming subjects to believe in 
sunspots nor is it restricted to situations with a public signal. We rather show that sunspot 
equilibria arise naturally with salient public signals. When subjects receive only public sig-
nals, they reliably converge to the sunspot equilibrium that is implied by the signals’ seman-
tic. However, extrinsic private signals may have a significant impact on behavior as well. 
Highly correlated private signals lead some groups of subjects to coordinate on a non-
equilibrium strategy in which actions are also conditioned on their signals.  
Coordination on the salient sunspot equilibrium is less pronounced when public and 
private signals interact. Some subjects then condition their actions again on the private sig-
                                                     
7 Duffy (2016) and Cornand and Heinemann (2014) provides extensive surveys of the growing literature on laborato-
ry experiments in macroeconomics and central banking.  
8 Focal points may provide a natural way to break the payoff symmetry in pure coordination games where the game’s 
formal structure provides no guidance for equilibrium selection (Schelling, 1960). 
9 Previous research has shown that signals need to be semantically meaningful for generating sunspot equilibria in 
the lab (Duffy and Fisher 2005). 
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nal, which either prevents full coordination or leads to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium 
that is closer to 50 than under the absence of private signals. This implies that private sig-
nals reduce the power of the public signal to serve as a focal point for actions. In some cas-
es, private signals completely wipe out the focal-point character of public signals, so that 
subjects either ignore all signals or do not manage to coordinate on any equilibrium.  
Our results indicate that the likelihood of sunspot-driven actions and their impact 
rises continuously in the correlation of signals and that the power of sunspots is significant-
ly lower if public and private signals are combined. These results are of both practical and 
theoretical importance. From a practical point of view, our results contribute to a better 
understanding of the causes for a sudden swing of expectations and a reversal of capital 
flows triggering financial crises. They may also be useful for understanding communication 
strategies of central banks, such as forward guidance.10 Salient public messages can indeed 
change beliefs and behavior in the desired direction, even if they are not backed by a com-
mitment to actions affecting fundamentals. However, in a world of public and private mes-
sages, the power of public messages may be lower and adding public signals to existing pri-
vate signals may even reduce welfare.   
These results add a different perspective to the recent discussion of the effectiveness 
of forward guidance. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2015) argue that in DSGE models, 
credible announcements of interest rate projections have larger effects on key macroeco-
nomic variables than seem empirically plausible. Several recent contributions try to resolve 
this “forward guidance puzzle”, for example, by modifying the micro-foundations of the 
New-Keynesian framework (Gabaix, 2016; McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016) or by 
relaxing the common knowledge assumption about policies and agents’ behavior (Angele-
tos and Lian, 2016).11 The findings of the present paper in conjunction with previous exper-
iments on sunspots suggest that central bank communication may not be as powerful as 
predicted because of coordination frictions. If public signals lack salience and, thus, do not 
provide focal points for beliefs, or if central bank announcements compete for attention 
with already existing private forecasts of similar salience, agents may find it hard to coordi-
nate their beliefs and actions.  
On the theory side, our results support that sunspot equilibria are not just a theoret-
ical curiosity but a serious phenomenon that reliably shows up whenever agents’ focus is 
directed towards salient extrinsic public signals. Agents may also coordinate on extrinsic 
private signals, even though such strategies do not constitute an equilibrium. This is in line 
                                                     
10 Reis (2012) discusses the importance of announcements and accountability for forward guidance in the light of 
time inconsistency associated with Odyssean forward guidance. 
11 Gabaix (2016) incorporates myopic agents into a “behavioral” New-Keynesian framework, which naturally attenu-
ates the impact of future shocks, while McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) consider an incomplete market 
model where agents face income risk and borrowing constraints. In Angeletos and Lian (2016), forward guidance is 
modelled by intrinsic private signals. Since agents lack common knowledge, they cannot perfectly coordinate their 
actions, which make forward guidance less effective.  
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with the model of near-rational behavior (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) and related to ra-
tional inattention as laid out in Sims (2010). Finally, our observation that different groups 
may converge to different equilibria in the same environment conflicts with selection theo-
ries that single out a unique strategy combination for each game and calls for probabilistic 
theories to describe aggregate behavior. 
Our study also complements the literature on the emergence of sunspots in the la-
boratory, which has mostly focused on public extrinsic information. Marimon, Spear and 
Sunder (1993) show that subjects who learned to condition their price forecasts on a peri-
odic intrinsic signal continue conditioning their actions once the signal becomes extrinsic. 
Duffy and Fisher (2005) were the first to show that random messages can be strong enough 
to sustain a sunspot equilibrium, provided that they are semantically salient. A few more 
recent experiments have explored the impact of sunspots when equilibria can be Pareto 
ranked. Arifovic, Evans, and Kostyshyna (2013) demonstrate that sunspots can sustain co-
ordination on a payoff-dominated equilibrium in a production economy where subjects 
have to forecast the average production level. Subjects are less coordinated when equilibria 
are Pareto-ranked than in a comparable treatment in which payoffs are independent of the 
equilibrium. Arifovic and Jiang (2013) focus on a bank-run game and find that sunspots may 
only affect behavior if strategic uncertainty is high, i.e., when the tension between efficiency 
and security is high. Beugnot et al. (2009) find no evidence for coordination on a sunspot 
equilibrium if there is a non-sunspot equilibrium that is payoff-dominant, maximin, and 
weakly risk-dominant. 
A common feature of the previously mentioned experiments (except Beugnot et al., 
2009) is that subjects are trained to believe in the sunspot in order to generate sunspot 
equilibria. Our experiment shows for the first time that sunspot equilibria may arise endog-
enously without any need of training. Moreover, in contrast to the previous papers, we in-
vestigate situations with private signals that allow us to draw more general inferences 
about the power of sunspots. Indeed, our results suggest that private signals can generate 
sunspot-driven behavior if the signals obtained by different agents are sufficiently correlat-
ed, and private signals can attenuate the power of public signals as sunspot variables.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
The game that we use for the experiment is a pure coordination game. It can be considered 
as a reduced form of a macro model with self-fulfilling prophecies, in which professional 
forecasters predict the inflation rate, and the resulting inflation rate will be determined by 
the average forecast. Forecasters have an incentive to provide accurate forecasts and this 
accuracy is higher the closer an individual forecast is to the average. In the experiment, we 
consider a two-player version of this game. Thus, both forecasters’ payoffs are decreasing in 
the distance between their individual forecasts.  
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Formally, two agents i and j independently and simultaneously pick actions 
𝑎𝑖,𝑎𝑗 ∈ [𝑏, 𝑐]. Agent i’s payoff is given by  
                       𝜋𝑖�𝑎𝑖,𝑎𝑗� = 𝐴 − 𝑑�𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑗�
2
 𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝐴 > 0,𝑑 > 0.   (1) 
Agent i maximizes her payoff when she matches agent j’s action. Clearly, any coordinated 
pick of numbers constitutes a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, both agents receive 
the same payoff and, moreover, the payoff is exactly the same in all equilibria. 
2.1 Equilibria with Signals  
Delphic Forward guidance can be introduced in this game as a payoff-irrelevant public sig-
nal that provides a focal point for expectations and possibly competes with private an-
nouncements on the same topic. Let Φ be the set of all the possible public signals that 
agents might receive and let Ψ𝑖  be the set of possible private signals for agent i. For ease of 
presentation, let us assume that Ψ𝑖 = Ψ for both i (as in the experiment), and that Ψ is fi-
nite. Let 𝑃: (Φ,Ψ,Ψ) → [0,1 ] be the joint probability distribution on the signals, where P 
assigns strictly positive probabilities on each element in (Φ,Ψ,Ψ). A strategy is mapping 
signals to the interval [𝑏, 𝑐]. The following proposition states that equilibrium strategies do 
not depend on private signals. 
Proposition 1: Let 𝑠∗ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy profile, where 𝑠𝑖∗(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) is the 
action played by agent i with public signal 𝜑 and private signal 𝜓𝑖 . In equilibrium, actions are 
the same for both agents and do not depend on the private signal, that is, for any given public 
signal 𝜑 ∈ Φ: 𝑠𝑖∗(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) = 𝑠𝑗∗�𝜑,𝜓𝑗�  for all 𝜓𝑖,𝜓𝑗 ∈ Ψ. 
Proof: see Online-Appendix A.■  
Proposition 1 implies that private signals are ignored in equilibrium. Consequently, 
the set of Nash equilibria is the same as in a version of the game without private signals. 
The intuition for this result is the following. If, for any public signal, a player’s action de-
pends on her private signal, the best response of the other player is closer to the first play-
er’s expected action given the public signal. Iterative best response leads actions to con-
verge to strategies that may only depend on public signals. When there is a public signal, 
sunspot equilibria exist in which both agents condition their actions on the public signal. 
Any function 𝑓:Φ → [𝑏, 𝑐] is an equilibrium, provided that both agents follow the same 
function and, thus, are always perfectly coordinated.12 In the interpretation of this model, 
                                                     
12 Proposition 1 can be extended to show that every correlated equilibrium must also fulfill the condition that 
𝑠𝑖∗(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) = 𝑠𝑗∗�𝜑,𝜓𝑗� ∀ 𝜓𝑖 ,𝜓𝑗 ∈ Ψ. Therefore, in the game presented, the set of correlated equilibria and the set of 
Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide. This differs from Angeletos (2008) who presents a threshold game in which there 
are equilibria with strategies depending on imperfectly correlated signals that may be interpreted as private sunspots. 
Duffy and Feltovich (2010) provide experimental evidence for correlated equilibria. 
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forward guidance may move expectations in the desired direction, but there are also equi-
libria with opposing or no effects of public messages. 
2.2 Riskiness of Equilibria 
For analyzing the results of the experiment, it is helpful that equilibria can be ordered by 
the risk-dominance criterion in the notion of Haruvy and Stahl (2004) that is based on a 
heuristic justification by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).13 According to this criterion, an equi-
librium strategy is risk dominant if it maximizes the expected payoff in an initial state of 
uncertainty where the players have uniformly distributed second-order beliefs on all equi-
libria. This notion provides a transitive order of risk dominance, which is, in our game, in-
verse to the distance of a strategy from the midpoint of the action space [𝑏, 𝑐]. That is, a 
strategy that is closer to the midpoint risk dominates a strategy further away from the mid-
point.  
Our next result establishes this order, characterizes the risk dominant equilibrium 
and shows that it coincides with the action that maximizes the minimum possible payoff, 
known as the secure action (see Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990). Moreover, it shows 
that the selected equilibrium is independent of the generated signals. 
Proposition 2: ϕψψϕ ,
2
),(* ∀+= cbs ii  is both the secure action and the risk-dominant equi-
librium. If �𝑠𝑖(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) −
𝑏+𝑐
2
� < �?̃?𝑖(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) −
𝑏+𝑐
2
�  for all 𝜑,𝜓𝑖 , then 𝑠𝑖 risk dominates ?̃?𝑖. 
Proof: see Online-Appendix A.■ 
Both measures of risk (risk dominance and minimal possible payoff) can be ex-
pressed as a function increasing in the absolute distance between an action and (𝑏 + 𝑐)/2. 
Therefore, throughout the rest of the paper, we will interpret the absolute distance to 
(𝑏 + 𝑐)/2 as a measure of risk. We will say that an extrinsic signal or a combination of ex-
trinsic signals exerts a stronger effect on behavior than another signal, if the average dis-
tance between chosen actions and the midpoint (𝑏 + 𝑐)/2 is larger.  
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses  
Game setup: In the experiment, subjects repeatedly play the coordination game explained 
above. At the beginning, subjects are randomly assigned to fixed groups of six and in each 
period they are randomly matched into pairs within these groups. Subjects have to choose, 
independently and simultaneously, an integer between 0 and 100 (both included) and the 
                                                     
13 In its original formulation by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), risk dominance is a binary relation that may be intransi-
tive and does not provide a strict order in our game. In any restricted version of our game allowing for just two ac-
tions, both actions are equally risky. 
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payoff function is given by (1) with A=200 and d=1/50.14 Subjects play the game for 80 pe-
riods. After each period, they are informed about their partner’s choice, the distance be-
tween their own choice and their partner’s choice, and the resulting payoff.  
Extrinsic information: To supplement the coordination game with extrinsic information, 
the computer draws a random number 𝑍 ∈ {0,100} in each period. Both numbers are equal-
ly likely and the realization is not disclosed to the subjects (except in one control treat-
ment). Instead, each subject in a pair receives at least one signal 𝑠 ∈ {0,100}. With probabil-
ity 𝑝 ∈ [0.5,1], signal 𝑠 is the same as the random number Z, that is, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏(𝑠 = 0|𝑍 = 0) =
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏(𝑠 = 100|𝑍 = 100) = 𝑝. Probability p measures the precision of signals and is one of 
our treatment variables. The more precise the signals are, the higher is the correlation be-
tween two signals, and the greater is the likelihood that both signals are the same. The ran-
dom number Z allows us to use the same framing of signals across different treatments and 
it introduces correlations that can be understood by subjects without statistical training. In 
all treatments subjects are informed about how the signals are generated including the 
treatment-specific probabilities.15 
Treatments: In all treatments, subjects play the coordination game introduced in Section 2. 
In the benchmark treatment (Treatment N “No signal”) subjects receive no extrinsic infor-
mation, whereas in all other treatments they receive some extrinsic information (signals). 
More specifically, we vary (i) the probability with which subjects receive the same signal, 
and (ii) the number of signals that a subject receives.  
In Treatment C (“Common signal”), subjects always receive a common (public) signal 
𝑌 = 0 or 𝑌 = 100. It equals Z with probability 𝑝 =  0.75, and it is common information that 
both subjects in the pair receive the same signal. In Treatments P75 and P95, each subject in 
a pair receives a conditionally independent ”Private signal” 𝑋𝑖. The probability p with which 
signal 𝑋𝑖 coincides with the number Z is 0.75 in P75 and 0.95 in P95. In Treatment CP 
(“Common and Private signal”), a subject receives both a common (public) signal Y and a 
private signal 𝑋𝑖. Signals are drawn independently conditional on Z and each signal coin-
cides with the random number Z with probability p = 0.75.  
Subjects are always informed about which signal conveys public and private infor-
mation and subjects never learn their partners’ private signal. Though, after each period, 
subjects are informed about the realization of the random variable Z. We also implemented 
                                                     
14 In contrast to the game in Section 3, subjects could only choose integers between 0 and 100 instead of choosing 
from an interval of real numbers. Technically, strategies assigning different numbers to different private signals are 
equilibria if the difference between the two chosen numbers is at most 5 (1) in treatments with a high (low) correla-
tion of private signals. We do not observe these contrived equilibria and therefore ignore them in the following anal-
ysis. 
15 The instructions explained the payoff function (2) in detail and subjects had to answer questions about the game’s 
procedures and in particular how the payoffs were determined before the experiment started. These questions en-
sured that subjects understood how their payoff would be determined and, in particular, that neither the number Z, 
nor the signals would affect their payoff. Moreover, subjects could clarify any last-minute questions and gain confi-
dence that the other players understood the game.  
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two further treatments (AC “Almost Common signal” and CC “Two Common signals”) as 
robustness checks that will be explained in Section 4.4. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
different treatments. 
Proposition 1 implies that the set of equilibria in Treatments P75 and P95 coincides 
with the set of equilibria in Treatment N. In Treatments C and CP any function mapping 
public signals to [0,100] is an equilibrium.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Procedures: In total, 288 undergraduate students from various fields of study (engineer-
ing, business administration, mathematics, chemistry, etc.) participated in the experiment 
at Technische Universität Berlin.16 At the end of a session, we determined the subjects’ 
earnings by randomly selecting 10 out of the 80 periods for payment. The payoffs in these 
rounds were converted to euros (1 point = 1 euro cent). Sessions lasted about one hour. 
Subjects were paid in private and earned, on average, 21 euros (including a fee of 3 euros 
for showing up). 
Hypotheses: We want to learn how strongly public and private extrinsic signals affect be-
havior. The first hypothesis provides a benchmark for behavior in absence of extrinsic sig-
nals: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  In the absence of extrinsic signals, subjects coordi-
nate on 50. 
As previously emphasized, any coordinated pick constitutes an equilibrium. However, as 
explained in Section 2, 50 minimizes strategic risk.17  
The main goal of the experiment is to understand how different information struc-
tures affect the salience of signal(s), so that public or private signals pull behavior away 
from the risk minimizing action 50 towards the number(s) indicated by the signal(s). We 
refer to this characteristic as the power of sunspots. Our design gives us two natural 
measures for the power of sunspots: (i) the number of groups in each treatment who coor-
dinate on strategies that are driven by sunspots and (ii) the average distance of chosen ac-
tions from 50 (given that H1 is not rejected).  
If extrinsic signals affect behavior, we should see significant differences between 
treatments with extrinsic signals and Treatment N. Thus, our null hypothesis is: 
                                                     
16 The experiment was computerized using the software toolkit z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and we recruited subjects 
from a database where students can register to participate in economic experiments (ORSEE, Greiner 2015). For a 
more detailed description of the procedures and sample instructions, see Appendix D and E. 
17 Additionally, choosing the midpoint of the interval is the unique equilibrium in symmetric strategies according to 
the theory of focal points by Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013) and constitutes the best response to a random choice 
by the other player. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): With extrinsic signals, subjects coordinate on the same strategies 
as without extrinsic signals. 
Alternatively, we may observe the emergence of sunspot-driven behavior. In that case, we 
expect the semantics to matter such that players choose higher actions for signal 100 than 
for signal 0. If H2 is rejected, we can analyze how the power of sunspots is driven by the 
correlation between players’ signals: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  The power of an extrinsic signal rises in the proba-
bility that the other subject receives the same signal.  
This probability is 62.5% in P75, 90.5% in P95 and 100% in C. Finally, the next hypothesis 
is used to analyze how the interaction of different signals affects their power. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4):  When subjects receive public and private signals, the 
respective power of these signals is the same as in treatments with pure pub-
lic or private signals of the same precision.  
Since private signals should be ignored in equilibrium, we should observe convergence to 
the same strategies in Treatments CP and C. The alternatives are that private signals exert 
some power themselves or change the attractiveness of public signals as focal points.  
4. Results 
As explained above we rely on two natural measures for the power of sunspots. First, we 
measure the power of sunspots by how distant the chosen actions are from 50. In order to 
simplify the analysis, we utilize that subjects’ strategies are symmetric with respect to the 
signals. In other words, subjects who choose 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑚 when they receive signal 𝑠 =  0 play 
𝑎𝑖 = 100 −𝑚 when their signal is 𝑠 =  100.18 If extrinsic signals affect behavior, they raise 
the average distance of choices from 50. To get a sense how coordinated such deviations 
from 50 are, we complement the “distance from 50” with the coordination rate, defined as 
the proportion of pairings in which the actions of the two subjects are the same or deviate 
by one. 
Second, we focus on the number of groups that coordinate on sunspot-driven strate-
gies. Because we cannot expect that subjects’ actions are in equilibrium from the start of a 
session, we are mostly interested in subjects’ behavior after some convergence periods. To 
check whether groups coordinated their actions by converging to a common strategy we 
introduce two convergence criteria. The strong convergence criterion requires that all six 
subjects in a matching group play according to the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±1, 
                                                     
18 In Treatment CP symmetry refers to playing m when both signals are 0, 100-m when both signals are 100. For 
unaligned signals symmetry requires that a player who chooses n when the public signal is 0 and the private signal is 
100, plays 100-n when the public signal is 100 and the private signal is 0. In Appendix B, we show that symmetry 
applies to actions played during the entire experiment and to the strategies subjects converged to. 
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in Periods 70–79. The weak convergence criterion requires that at least four subjects in a 
matching group follow the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±3, in Periods 70–79.19  
For converging groups, we identify four types of strategies they coordinated on: 1) 
“50”: the secure action; 2) intermediate sunspot strategies, such as “25/75” or “10/90”, in 
which subjects choose the lower number when the signal is 0 and the higher number when 
the signal is 100; 3) “0/100”: follow the signal; 4) “Mean”: play the average of both signals. 
In Treatment CP, strategies of types 2) and 3) refer to the public signal only.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports how many groups converged according to the two criteria (strong 
and weak convergence) for each treatment. The first row indicates how many groups con-
verged to a joint strategy according to the strong (weak) criterion. The rows below provide 
a more detailed picture and show for each identified strategy the number of groups who 
converged to this strategy along with the median period of weak convergence in brackets.  
 
4.1 Single signals and sunspot-driven behavior 
Setting the stage for the further analyses, we first test whether the secure action 
serves as focal point in the absence of extrinsic signals (Treatment N). Table 2 shows that 
all groups converged to “50” and the median time for weak convergence is only 3 periods. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the average distance to 50 over the 80 periods for Treat-
ments N and C. It is apparent that subjects quickly converged to playing 𝑎𝑖 = 50 in Treat-
ment N. The average distance of actions from 50 was 0.81 and the average coordination rate 
was 92 percent. When testing whether actual choices are distributed around 50, we cannot 
reject hypothesis H1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.6, two-sided).20  
[Figure 1 about here] 
We now focus on the treatments with extrinsic signals. We first test, whether extrin-
sic signals have an effect at all (Hypothesis 2) and then whether the impact of extrinsic sig-
nals increases in the probability that both subjects receive the same signal (Hypothesis 3).  
                                                     
19 We do not include Period 80, because some subjects deviate exclusively in the last period. Tables C1 and C2 in 
Appendix C show more detailed results including the periods in which the groups converged to a particular strategy 
according to the strong and weak convergence criterion.  
20 In all nonparametric tests we used a matching group as an independent observation, because from Period 2 on-
wards, individual choices were affected by observing other group members. Unless otherwise noted, we aggregated 
the data across all 80 periods in a matching group. Note that this presents a conservative way to detect any significant 
effects. If not indicated otherwise, all results obtained by using the Mann-Whitney test are robust to using the robust 
rank-order test (see Feltovich (2003) for a discussion of this test). 
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Using group-specific averages as independent observations, we can reject that the 
average distances are equal across Treatments N, P75, P95, and C according to a Kruskal-
Wallis test (p < 0.01). In Treatment C, in which an extrinsic signal is publicly available, there 
is a clear convergence process towards choosing the action that is indicated by the signal. 
Indeed, all groups converged to playing 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑌 (see Table 2) and the average coordination 
rate was 83 percent. The average absolute distance to 50 was 46.69 over all periods and 
49.82 during the last 10 periods (see Figure 1). In the end, all subjects followed the public 
signal. This is remarkable since no previous experiment has generated sunspot equilibria 
without subjects being trained to follow the sunspots. Obviously, we can reject Hypothesis 
H2 of no difference in the average distance between Treatments N and C (Mann-Whitney 
test, p < 0.01, two-sided).  
Result 1: Sunspot equilibria emerge reliably in the presence of a salient (but extrinsic) 
public signal. 
Table 2 reveals that different groups converged to different strategies in treatments with 
private signals. While in Treatment P75 all groups converged to 50, this is not the case 
when private signals are highly correlated as in Treatment P95. Here, we observe two 
groups that coordinated on sunspot-driven strategies even though this is not an equilibri-
um. This behavior is also reflected in the average distance to 50.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 plots the average distance to 50 by blocks of 10 periods in these two treat-
ments separately for each group. While the average distance is close to zero in all groups of 
Treatment P75, it is either close to or deviates substantially from zero in Treatment P95. 
For example, the average distance is about 40 in Groups 13 and 14, and hovers around 20 in 
Group 18.  Over all groups, the average distance to 50 in Treatment P95 is 17.3. A pair-wise 
comparison of Treatment N with P75 shows no significant difference in the average dis-
tance to 50 (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.109, two-sided). However, we can clearly reject that 
average distances are equal in N and in P95 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, two-sided). High-
ly correlated private signals not only result in a larger absolute distance to 50, but also in 
lower coordination rates. Subjects are less likely to be coordinated in P95 (65 percent) than 
in P75 (85 percent) or C (83 percent).  
Result 2: Sunspot-driven behavior can arise with highly correlated extrinsic private 
signals even though this is no equilibrium.  
Recall that the probability that both subjects see the same signal is 62.5 percent in Treat-
ment P75, 90.5 percent in P95, and 100 percent in Treatment C. As suggested by Hypothesis 
3, we observe that the average distance from 50 is larger, the higher the probability that 
both players get the same signal is. According to a Jonckheere-Terpstra test, we can reject 
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the hypothesis that the distance from 50 is independent from the probability that both 
players receive the same signal in treatments P75, P95 and C (p < 0.01) in favor of the alter-
native hypothesis that the distance rises in this probability.21  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents additional evidence for the impact of extrinsic signals on behavior 
using panel regressions. The dependent variable is the distance to 50, which is regressed on 
treatment dummies for P75, P95, and C (Treatment N serves as the baseline). The regres-
sion in column 3 considers all 80 periods and shows a significant impact of extrinsic signals 
on the distance from 50 for all three treatments (P75, P95 and C). However, the effect size 
in P75 is close to zero and insignificant if we consider periods 11-80 (Column 2), suggesting 
that the difference in the distance to 50 between N and P75 stems from miscoordination in 
early periods. In contrast, the coefficients for P95 and C are significantly different from N 
irrespective of the time horizon we look at. The regression provides further support for Hy-
pothesis 3. Wald tests confirm that the average distance to 50 is significantly larger in P95 
than in P75 and significantly larger in C than in P95. Note that controlling for the period or 
the behavior of the opponent in the previous period does not affect the qualitative results. 
Result 3: The power of an extrinsic signal rises in the probability that the other subject 
receives the same signal.  
Our results suggest that subjects do react to private signals. Sunspot-driven behavior can 
emerge when the correlation between private signals is sufficiently high as in P95. While 
this is in contradiction to the theoretical prediction that sunspot equilibria do not exist with 
imperfect correlation of signals, it is consistent with the notion that subjects engage in a 
cost-benefit trade-off of additional steps of reasoning. In P95 the high correlation of private 
signals implies that the payoff difference between following one’s own private signal and 
best responding to an opponent who follows his private signal is small. Thus for some sub-
jects, the cost of engaging in an additional step of reasoning and calculating the best re-
sponse may outweigh the gain from best responding, in which case subjects display sun-
spot-driven behavior with no tendency towards the secure action.22 However, if the correla-
tion of private signals is as low as in P75, it is more profitable to find the optimal response 
against a subject who plays her signal and thus subjects quickly learn to ignore their private 
signals. 
                                                     
21 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is a non-parametric test for ordered alternatives, i.e., it tests the null hypothesis of 
P75 = P95 = C against the alternative hypothesis of P75 ≤ P95 ≤ C with at least one strict equality.   
22 For example, in P95 the expected payoff when both players follow their signal is €1.81 compared to €1.83 from 
best responding to an opponent who follows the signal by moving closer to 50. In P75, the difference is more sub-
stantial (€1.25 versus €1.53). This is akin to the model of near-rational behavior by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) show-
ing that small deviations from optimal behavior can lead to large aggregate fluctuations (for experimental evidence 
on how near-rational behavior interacts with the strategic environment see Fehr and Tyran, 2008). 
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4.2 The Interaction of Public and Private Signals 
The previous analysis has highlighted that sunspot-driven behavior emerges with increas-
ing correlation of the signals and that sunspot equilibria reliably occur when salient public 
information is available. We now turn to the question how robust such behavior is in the 
presence of multiple information sources. To answer this question, we focus on Treatment 
CP where subjects received two signals; a common (public) and a private signal. We com-
pare the effects of both signals to their effects in Treatments C and P75, where subjects re-
ceived either a common or a private signal of the same precision. 
Table 2 shows that different groups converged to different equilibria in Treatment 
CP, while they all converged to ignoring the signal in P75 and following it in C. Figure 3 
shows the average distance to 50 by 10-period blocks conditional on receiving aligned and 
unaligned signals for all groups in Treatment CP.23 Recall that equilibrium strategies do not 
depend on private signals. Thus, in equilibrium, the average distance is the same for aligned 
and unaligned signals. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
We observe that the average distance is substantially larger than zero throughout all 
periods for all but one group. While some groups did not manage to reach an equilibrium, 
the average distance for groups converging to a sunspot equilibrium was either close to the 
maximum distance of 50 or close to 25. Over all groups, the average distance was 31.6. 
Clearly, this is substantially larger than in Treatment P75 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, 
two-sided) but smaller than in Treatment C (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.02, two-sided).  
There are three possible explanations of why choices in Treatment CP are closer to 
the secure action than in Treatment C: (i) private signals might exert some power them-
selves, so that opposing signals (e.g., 𝑌 = 0 and 𝑋𝑖 = 100) lead to actions closer to 50 than 
aligned signals, (ii) private signals might reduce the power of public signals, or (iii) the 
mere presence of multiple signals impedes their ability to serve as focal-points. In the fol-
lowing, we present evidence in support of explanations (i) and (ii) by comparing the power 
of sunspots between Treatment CP and Treatments P75 and C, respectively. In Section 4.3, 
we present evidence against explanation (iii) by comparing Treatment CP with CC. 
For a direct test of the power of a public and private signal (Hypothesis 4), we meas-
ure the impact of each signal type by the difference between actions for a low and high real-
ization, holding the other signal constant. We compare these measures to the respective 
differences in Treatments P75 and C, where they are twice the distance to 50. 
                                                     
23 For a more comprehensive overview on each matching group, including the periods of convergence, see Table C2 
in Appendix C. 
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In Treatment CP, the average distance to the secure action was 35.19 when the pub-
lic and the private signal coincided and 26.12 otherwise. In other words, holding the public 
signal fixed, a low private signal led to actions that were about 9.07 lower than actions with 
a high private signal. This difference is statistically significant according to a Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs test (p < 0.01, two-sided), which establishes that private signals exert some 
power on their own, as suggested by explanation (i) above. The effect of private signals on 
choices is larger than in Treatment P75, where the average distance between actions for 
low and high signals was 5.02. Albeit the difference in the power of private signals between 
the two treatments is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.15, two-sided), so that we 
cannot reject Hypothesis 4 with respect to private signals.  
Holding the private signal constant, a low public signal led to actions that were on 
average 61.3 lower than actions with a high public signal. This distance is significantly 
smaller than in C, where it was 93.4 (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.02, two-sided). In fact, the 
deviation from 50 for aligned signals is significantly smaller than in Treatment C (Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.06, two-sided). Consequently, even the combined power of public and 
private signals is smaller than the power of the public signal in C. The smaller average dis-
tance to 50 in Treatment CP (as compared to C) is, thus, mainly due to the reduced power of 
the public signal.  
There is substantial heterogeneity in the coordination rates among groups: they are 
significantly higher for groups that follow the public signal or converge to 50 than for other 
groups. The coordination rate is positively correlated with the average distance (Spear-
man’s rank correlation, p = 0.01). This suggests that the beneficial role of public signals in 
coordinating actions is related to their power in dragging actions away from 50. Overall, the 
coordination rate in Treatment CP is only 55 percent and well below the coordination rate 
in C (83 percent, Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.06, two-sided). Thus, the presence of a private 
signal not only reduces the power of the public signal in dragging actions away from 50, but 
also impairs its ability to coordinate actions. Coordination is also lower than in P75 (Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.05, two-sided): while private signals with a low correlation cannot ham-
per coordination by themselves (as in P75), they can have a rather devastating effect in an 
environment with equally salient public signals.  
Result 4: Private signals reduce the power of public signals as coordinating devices.  
Why do private signals attenuate the power of pubic signals? Coordination becomes consid-
erably more difficult with private and public signals, presumably because subjects need to 
learn that (i) the private signal should be ignored and (ii) it may be good to condition one’s 
action on the public signal, even though it is intrinsically irrelevant. Apparently, this learn-
ing process takes longer than learning only one of these points in the other treatments.   
This is vividly illustrated by the process of convergence to intermediate sunspot 
equilibria. At least three groups converged to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium in which 
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subjects chose 25 whenever Y=0 and 75 when Y=100.24 Such an intermediate sunspot equi-
librium that is not implied by the semantics of signals has never been observed before. In 
fact, very few (2 out of 72) subjects in this treatment chose 25 or 75 in the first period. It 
may rather be the result of applying the maximin rule (maximize the minimum payoff). 
There are three popular strategies that are implied by the salience of signals: the secure 
action, following the public signal, and choosing the mean of both signals. In the first period, 
32 percent of all subjects chose the secure action and 43 percent followed the public signal. 
Thereby, 75 percent of first-period actions were consistent with any of these 3 strategies. 
The strategy “25/75” is the maximin response to any non-degenerate distribution of the 
three popular strategies that subjects played in the first period. Thus, it seems that the same 
force that drives actions to 50 in the absence of signals drives some groups to an intermedi-
ate sunspot equilibrium in the presence of public and private signals.   
4.3. Robustness Checks 
Multiple public signals: Are the reduced power of the public signal and the eventual oc-
currence of intermediate sunspot equilibria in Treatment CP really due to the coexistence of 
public and private signals or are they just caused by the presence of multiple signals? To 
address this question, we implemented Treatment CC, in which subjects receive two com-
mon (=public) signals with the same precision as in Treatment CP. Any effect driven by 
augmenting a public with a private signal in CP should be absent in CC, while effects merely 
driven by the number of signals can be identified by comparing Treatments CC and C.  
In CC, all groups converged to choosing the mean of both signals, which is the salient 
aggregate of the two signals. The coordination rate in CC was 89 percent, which is similar to 
C (83 percent, Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.81, two-sided). The average distance between the 
chosen actions and the secure action is 30.5 and, thus, almost the same as in CP (31.57). 
However, this is mainly due to the cases in which the two signals are not aligned. If signals 
are aligned, the distance is 48.97. This distance is approximately the same as in Treatment C 
(46.69, Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.44, two-sided), but significantly larger than in CP (Mann-
Whitney test, p < 0.02, two-sided). Thus, we cannot reject that the combined power of two 
equally salient public signals is the same as the power of a single public signal. If the two 
signals were unaligned, the average distance (2.79) is about the same as in Treatment N 
(2.51, Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.33, two-sided). Therefore, unaligned public signals that are 
equally salient neutralize each other.  
Together, these tests establish that the lower power of public signals in CP is not due 
to the multiplicity of signals, but due to the combination of public and private signals. If 
                                                     
24 The coordination rate in these groups (37 percent) is considerably lower than in groups converging to the public 
signal (78 percent) but higher than in non-converging groups (22 percent) While three groups converged according 
to our weak criterion (see Table 2), two more groups show a tendency towards “25/75” but 80 periods were not long 
enough to reach a common strategy.  
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multiple public signals can be aggregated in a simple way, then subjects quickly learn how 
to do it and use the aggregated signal as focal point for coordinating actions. Treatment CC 
also provides further support for Result 1, as all groups converge to the strategy implied by 
the semantics of public signals.  
Almost common signals. Result 2 shows that sunspot-driven behavior may arise with 
highly correlated extrinsic private signals. Since this is unprecedented evidence and in 
strong contrast to the equilibrium predictions, we provide a robustness check for this result 
by using a different frame for the extrinsic information. Specifically, we run a treatment 
where each agent gets signal Z with probability 0.9. Note that this probability is comparable 
to the probability that both subjects get the same signal in Treatment P95 (p = 0.905). The 
signal in Treatment AC (“Almost common signal”) generates common p-beliefs (with p = 
0.9) in the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989), while there are no common p-beliefs in 
Treatment P95. Therefore, Treatment AC represents an alternative test of whether behavior 
is discontinuous in p, as predicted by theory. In Treatment AC, no sunspot equilibrium ex-
ists since the information is not disseminated to all subjects with probability 1.  
In Treatment AC, we see 2 out of 6 groups converging to a sunspot-driven strategy 
(as in P95), while the other groups coordinated on 50. The average distance of choices from 
the secure action was 13.86, conditional on receiving a signal, it was 14.83 which is close to 
the average distance in Treatment P95 (17.26). Including Treatment AC in our previous 
regression model indicates that the distance to 50 is significantly higher than in Treatment 
N irrespective of the time horizon (see Table C3 in Appendix C). Again, Wald tests confirm 
that the average distance to 50 in AC is significantly larger than in P75 and significantly 
smaller than in C.25 This evidence supports our previous Results 2 and 3: if the probability 
that both subjects receive the same information is sufficiently large, private signals can lead 
to sunspot-driven behavior.  
4.4 Payoffs 
The previous results clearly show that different information structures induce very differ-
ent behavior. As long as groups quickly converge to coordinate an equilibrium, payoffs do 
not depend on the specific equilibrium they play. However, if an information structure re-
sults in a slow convergence process or in convergence to a non-equilibrium strategy, we 
observe frequent miscoordination and low payoffs.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 displays the average payoffs in the different treatments for the first 20 periods, for 
the last 20 periods, and for all periods. The table documents two results. First, in treatments 
                                                     
25 Further evidence comes from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test. We can reject the hypothesis that the average distance in 
Treatments P75, AC and C is the same in favor of the alternative hypothesis of P75 ≤ AC ≤ C (p < 0.01).  
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with no signals (N) or imprecise private signals (P75), groups coordinated quickly on the 
secure equilibrium and achieved almost the maximum payoff of 200 points. Similarly, pay-
offs are close to the maximum in Treatments C (195.37) and CC (194.69). Second, in treat-
ments with highly correlated private signals or with both public and private signals (P95, 
AC, and CP) different groups coordinated on different strategies and average payoffs were 
lower. Non-equilibrium strategies that were chosen by some groups in these treatments 
result in miscoordination and payoff losses. Groups who coordinated on intermediate sun-
spot equilibria, such as “25/75” in Treatment CP, achieved lower payoffs, because the con-
vergence process required more time than convergence to other equilibria. Even though the 
individual losses arising from strategies that condition actions on private signals might be 
small, such behavior affects the strategies of other players and, thus, prolongs the time that 
subjects need to coordinate. 
Result 5: Salient extrinsic public signals or private signals with low correlation do not 
affect payoffs from coordination. However, if private signals are highly correlat-
ed or combined with public signals, we observe considerable payoff losses due to 
miscoordination. 
For statistical support we ran nonparametric tests based on all 80 periods. This gives us a 
rigorous test of possible differences in payoffs, since it requires long periods of miscoordi-
nation to generate significant differences in average payoffs over the entire game. Accord-
ing to a Kruskal-Wallis test, we can reject that payoffs are the same in treatments with and 
without signals (p < 0.02). While pairwise comparisons between N and P75, C or CC are sta-
tistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.11, two-sided), the payoff differences be-
tween N and P95, AC or CP are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.03, two-
sided).  
5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we provided a systematic analysis of how the occurrence of sunspot-driven 
behavior depends on the noise structure of extrinsic signals. In a simple coordination game, 
inspired by Keynes’s beauty contest and interpreted as inflation forecasting game, we in-
troduced extrinsic signals and varied the number and correlation of signals in order to test 
their effects on behavior.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the impact of salient extrinsic signals de-
pends on the informational environment. As long as private signals with low correlation are 
the only information, subjects quickly learn to ignore them and focus on the action that 
minimizes strategic uncertainty. It needs at least highly correlated private signals to pull 
actions away from this secure action and generate sunspot-driven behavior. Such behavior 




Salient public signals, however, have a substantial impact on collective perceptions 
and sunspot equilibria reliably show up in an environment where subjects are neither 
trained nor recommended to follow these signals. Public signals are used as coordinating 
devices and their semantic implication replaces the role of the secure action as a focal point. 
Public signals do not significantly reduce coordination rates or payoffs.   
In contrast, if public signals are combined with private signals, the power of public 
signals is reduced. Coordination rates and payoffs are lower than in environments with 
pure private or public signals. Thus, the co-existence of equally salient public and private 
signals is harmful to coordination and induces payoff losses. 
Practically, these findings may have important implications. Central bank an-
nouncements made for the purpose of forward guidance can be seen as extrinsic public sig-
nals that are provided with the intention of moving expectations to another equilibrium. In 
order to achieve their goal, they should be as salient as possible and leave no room for 
speculation about their meaning, for example by providing numerical inflation or interest-
rate forecasts. Thereby, Delphic forward guidance can succeed in moving an economy from 
one equilibrium to another, even if it merely provides a focal point for expectations.  
Statements or comments (also by private agents) that oppose the central bank’s an-
nouncements can, however, diminish the intended shift of expectations. In practice, central-
bank announcements typically compete with private extrinsic signals for attention. Their 
power as focal point then presumably depends on their reliability as compared to compet-
ing private forecasts. Adding a public signal to an environment with already existing private 
signals of similar salience may lead to more frequent coordination failure and reduce wel-
fare.26  
Some authors have advocated that central banks should release information with 
ambiguity in order to avoid over-reactions (e.g., Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2014). However, it 
is not clear which effects ambiguous (and thus non-salient) central-bank messages have 
when they compete with salient but less informative private and public messages from oth-
er sources. Our results point to the possibility that salient uninformative (extrinsic) signals 
may be more powerful in moving markets than informative (intrinsic) but non-salient sig-
nals. 
The game form that we employed permits the use of risk dominance in the notion of 
Haruvy and Stahl (2004) for measuring the power of sunspots. Whether the power of ex-
trinsic private signals may be sufficiently strong to distract actions from a payoff-dominant 
equilibrium is an open question. 
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Number of subjects / 
number of groups 
N - - - No 36 /   6 
P75 - 1   75% No 36 /   6 
P95 - 1   95% No 36 /   6 
AC - 1* 100% No 36 /   6 
C 1 -   75% Yes 36 /   6 
CP 1 1   75% Yes 72 / 12 
CC 2 -   75% Yes 36 /   6 





Table 2: Coordination Summary. 
Treatment N P75 P95 AC C CP CC 
Number of groups 6 6 6 6 6 12 6 
Coordinated groupsa 5 (6) 5 (6) 3 (5) 5 (6) 4 (6) 6 (8) 4 (6) 
Strategiesb        










- 1 (1) 
[8] 
- 
           “25/75”  
 
n.a. - - - - 1 (2) 
[59] 
n.a. 
           “10/90”  
 
n.a. - 0 (2) 
[65] 
- - - n.a. 
           “0/100” 
 







           “Mean” 
 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - 4 (6) 
[3.5] 
Avg. distance to 50 0.81 2.51 17.25 13.86 46.69 31.57 30.50 
a  “Coordinated groups” indicates the number of groups who converged according to the strong 
 convergence criterion (weak convergence criterion in parentheses).  
b  “Strategies” details the number of groups converging to the identified strategy (weak criterion in 
parentheses). The median period in which groups converged according to the weak criterion is report-






Table 3: Panel Regression 
dependent variable: distance to 50 coordination rate 
  period 1-10 period 11-80 all periods all periods 
P75 9.306*** 0.612 1.698** -0.070 
 
(3.308) (0.562) (0.684) (0.061) 
P95 20.694*** 15.835** 16.443** -0.271** 
 
(5.067) (7.327) (6.963) (0.122) 
C 38.894*** 46.875*** 45.877*** -0.083 
 
(3.375) (2.309) (2.393) (0.085) 
Constant 3.792*** 0.388*** 0.814*** 0.920*** 
  (1.370) (0.142) (0.250) (0.029) 
Tests#: 
    P75=P95 0.024 0.019 0.018 - 
P95=C 0.005 0.000 0.000 - 
N 1440 10080 11520 5760 
R² 0.43 0.72 0.67 0.07 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Random-effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the matching group level. The depend-
ent variable in Column 1-3 is the distance of a choice to 50 and in Column 4 the coordination rate, which is 
the proportion of pairings choosing the same action (with a maximum deviation of +/-1). 
# Tests: The p-values correspond to Wald tests (one-sided) based on the regression results and are adjusted 






Table 4: Average Payoffs 
  Treatments without public signals  Treatments with public signals 
Treatment  N P75 P95 AC  C CP CC 
Period 1-20  197.43 188.58 180.65 185.17  190.26 180.83 187.50 
Period 61-80  199.71 199.00 193.09 193.96  199.60 195.42 197.86 
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Appendix A: Proofs - For Online Publication. 
Proposition 1: Let *s  be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy profile, where ),(* iis ψϕ  is the 
action played by agent i with public signal ϕ  and private signal iψ . In equilibrium, actions are 
the same for both agents and do not depend on the private signal, that is, for any given public 
signal Φ∈ϕ : ),(),( ** jjii ss ψϕψϕ =   for all Ψ∈ji ψψ , .  
Proof: We will prove the proposition in three steps. 
Step 1. We show that the equilibrium must be in pure strategies. For any given set of signals, it must 
be that  







where ),|( ijprob ψϕψ  is the probability that the other player receives signal 
jψ  when agent i re-
ceives signal iψ  and the public signal is ϕ . The expression to be maximized is strictly concave, so 
the best response must be unique. Hence, it cannot be that in equilibrium different actions are 
played with positive probabilities for the same combination of signals. 
Step 2. In equilibrium, the lowest [highest] actions played for some given public signal must be the 
same for both players, that is, 








=  for ji ≠ .  
We will show this by contradiction. Suppose that, for some signals, Player i chooses an action that is 
smaller than any action of Player j. Then Player i can raise her payoffs for all possible realizations of 
the signals by increasing this action. Hence, the lowest actions must be the same for all agents. The 
same argument holds for the highest actions. 




=  for both players. Suppose that 




< . By Step 2, there is a private signal jψ , at which Player j also chooses  




= . Here, his expected payoff is     







If Player j increases his lowest action, his expected payoff rises according to  

























Thus, Player j has an incentive to raise his minimal action. The same argument holds for the highest 
action. Thus, whenever one player chooses different actions for different private signals, the best 
reply of the other player is moving to the center of the interval defined by the most extreme actions 
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of the other player. This, however, cannot be an equilibrium, because the extreme actions of differ-
ent players should be the same according to Step 2.  
Therefore, it must be that ),(),( ** jjii ss ψϕψϕ =   for all Ψ∈ji ψψ , .  ■ 
Proposition 2: ϕψψϕ ,
2
),(* ∀+= cbs ii  is both the secure action and the risk-dominant equi-
librium. If �𝑠𝑖(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) −
𝑏+𝑐
2
� < �?̃?𝑖(𝜑,𝜓𝑖) −
𝑏+𝑐
2
�  for all 𝜑,𝜓𝑖 , then 𝑠𝑖 risk dominates ?̃?𝑖  
in the notion of Haruvy and Stahl (2004).  
Proof. The minimum payoff that a player might get if he chooses action x, is the payoff resulting 
from the opponent choosing either of the extremes, that is min{𝐴 − 𝑑(𝑥 − 𝑏)2,𝐴 − 𝑑(𝑥 − 𝑐)2}. This 
function is maximized at x = (b+c)/2, and therefore playing the middle action maximizes the mini-
mum payoff. Hence, the midpoint of the interval is the secure action. 
Haruvy and Stahl (2004, p. 322) define risk dominance as follows: “Given a symmetric n × n 
game with payoff matrix U, let NE denote the set of Nash equilibrium actions, and let ΔNE denote the 
simplex on NE. For each j ∈ NE, define RDjq  as the relative proportion of ΔNE for which action j is the 
best response to some belief in ΔNE. Then the action k ∈ NE that maximizes Uk qRD (where Uk is the 
kth row of the payoff matrix) is the risk-dominant NE action.” 
In our game, NE is the interval [b,c]. Due to the quadratic loss function, the relative propor-
tion of ΔNE for which an action is a best response is larger, the closer the action is to the midpoint of 
the action space (b+c)/2. These proportions define RDjq  in our game. This distribution is symmetric 
and has a unique maximum at (b+c)/2. Thus, the best response to this distribution is the midpoint 
itself. Comparing any subset of actions, the one with the smallest deviation from the midpoint yields 





Appendix B: Symmetry of Actions - For Online Publication 
Here, we analyze whether actions played during the experiment are symmetric, that is whether a 
subject choosing 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑚 when she receives signal 𝑠 =  0 also chooses 𝑎𝑖 = 100 −𝑚 when receiving 
signal 𝑠 =  100. Symmetry allows us to measure the power of sunspots by the distance of chosen 
actions from 50, independent of whether signals are 0 or 100.  
Note that for treatments with two signals, symmetry refers to playing m when both signals 
are 0 and 100 −𝑚 when both signals are 100. When the two signals are different in CP, symmetry 
means playing n when the public signal is 0 and the private signal is 100, and 100 − 𝑛 when the 
public signal is 100 and the private signal is 0. For two distinct public signals in Treatment CC, 
symmetry prescribes playing 50 as in situations without signals. To test the symmetry of strategies 
we estimate the following model: 
𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑆100 + 𝛽2P𝑒𝑝𝑤𝑝𝑑 + 𝛼𝑖+𝑢𝑖𝑖 
 
Table B1: Symmetry of Decisions 
 Dependent variable: ita  
 P75 P95 C CP CC AC 
    Y=Xi Y≠Xi Y=X Y≠X  
Signal=100 (D) 0.113 -1.086 -0.212 -0.280 -1.878** 0.019 -0.443 0.962** 
 (0.517) (1.099) (0.511) (0.449) (0.939) (0.485) (0.447) (0.471) 
Period 0.110*** 0.058* -0.118** 0.043 -0.198*** -0.039 0.018*** 0.043 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.055) (0.038) (0.062) (0.029) (0.006) (0.048) 
Constant 43.321*** 31.245*** 8.726* 13.675*** 34.617*** 3.662* 49.403*** 33.916*** 
 (1.866) (6.446) (4.780) (2.789) (3.916) (2.004) (0.463) (7.617) 
chi² 10.95 3.93 6.40 2.86 10.37 2.85 11.00 11.58 
R² 0.07 0.006 0.043 0.003 0.044 0.005 0.002 0.003 
N 2880 2880 2880 3456 2304 1728 1152 2662 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Random-effects GLS regression with robust standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses. (D) de-
notes dummy variable, equal signal refers to (Xi = Y) or (Y1 = Y2) and unequal signals to (Xi ≠ Y) or (Y1 ≠ Y2). 
Treatment AC only includes observations where the random number Z was revealed to subjects. For CC, the 
constant is not significantly different from 50 (p=0.20).   
 
The dependent variable is the decision of individual i. We transform this variable to 
𝑎𝑖 = 100 −𝑚 when the private signal is 𝑠 =  100 (as in P75, P95, and AC), when the public signal is 
𝑠 =  100 (as in C and CP), or when the public signal 𝑌1 is 𝑠 =  100 (as in CC). Thus the dependent 
variable 𝑎𝑖𝑖 always measures the distance to zero irrespective of the signal realization. As inde-
pendent variables we include “Period” to control for the time trend and a dummy variable, “S100”, 
which equals 1 if the private signal equals 100 (in P75, P95, or AC) or the public signal equals 100 
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(in C, CP, or Y1 in CC). For Treatment AC, we consider only observations in which the random num-
ber Z was revealed to the subjects. For Treatments CP and CC we estimate separate regressions for 
equal signals 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑌 or 𝑌1 = 𝑌2  and unequal signals𝑋𝑖 ≠ 𝑌 or 𝑌1 ≠ 𝑌2. For Treatment CC, we also test 
whether the constant equals 50, which amounts to both public signals having the same impact on 
behavior. 
The regression results are displayed in Table B1. We only report the results of a random ef-
fects model as specified above in which we control for repeated decisions of the same subject as 
well as for dependencies within matching groups. Alternatively, we used a simple OLS model with 
clustering at the group level, which does not impose any restriction on the correlation within 
groups. Our variable of interest is the dummy for the signal “S100”. If decisions are symmetric, the 
coefficient 𝛽𝑖 should be close to zero and insignificant. Indeed we observe for treatments P75, P95, C 
and CC that the coefficient for “S100” is not significantly different from zero. The same is true for 
treatment CP when the signals are equal. In CP with unequal signals and in AC we find that “S100” is 
significant at the 5-percent-level, but numerically small. This is mainly due to one matching group in 
each of the two treatments. If we exclude these two groups the coefficient for “S100” is insignificant 
in both regressions. The OLS regressions with clustering at the group level yield insignificant coeffi-





Appendix C. Additional Tables - For Online Publication 
 
Table C1: Aggregate Results of Non-sunspot Treatments 
Treatment Session Group Strategy T6 T4 
Avg. coord. 
rate 
Avg. payoff (std. 
dev.) 

































































































































Notes: T4 denotes the earliest period from which at least 4 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one peri-
od, allowing a deviation of ±3. T6 denotes the earliest period from which all 6 subjects play the same strategy until the 
last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±1. The avg. coordination rate is the percentage of pairs choosing the same 
action within a range of ±1 over all periods. 
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Table C2: Aggregate Results of Sunspots Treatments 
Treatment Session Group Strategy T6 T4 Avg. coord. rate 
Avg. payoff  
(std. dev.) 
































































































































Notes: T4 denotes the earliest period from which at least 4 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one peri-
od, allowing a deviation of ±3. T6 denotes the earliest period from which all 6 subjects play the same strategy until the 
last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±1. The avg. coordination rate is the percentage of pairs choosing the same 
action within a range of ±1 over all periods. 
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Table C3: Panel Regression 1 
dependent variable: distance to 50 
  period 1-10 period 11-80 all periods 
P75 9.306*** 0.612 1.698** 
 
(3.308) (0.562) (0.684) 
AC 16.870** 13.670* 14.070* 
 
(7.154) (8.220) (8.018) 
P95 20.694*** 15.835** 16.443** 
 
(5.067) (7.327) (6.963) 
C 38.894*** 46.875*** 45.877*** 
 
(3.375) (2.309) (2.393) 
Constant 3.792*** 0.388*** 0.814*** 
  (1.370) (0.142) (0.250) 
Tests#: 
   P75=AC 0.161 0.056 0.062 
P75=P95 0.047 0.037 0.035 
AC=C 0.006 0.000 0.000 
N 1774 12408 14182 
R² 0.33 0.59 0.55 
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Random-effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the matching group level. The de-
pendent variable in Column 1-3 is the distance of a choice to 50. 
# Tests: The p-values correspond to Wald tests (one-sided) based on the regression results and are ad-
justed for multiple testing using Holm’s method.  
 
 2 
  3 
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Appendix D: Detailed Procedures - For Online Publication 1 
Procedures: The general procedure was the same in each session and treatment. At the begin-2 
ning of a session, the subjects were seated at computer stations in random order. The instruc-3 
tions were distributed and read out aloud, and if a player had any questions, these were an-4 
swered in private. Throughout the sessions, the subjects were not allowed to communicate with 5 
one another and could not see each other’s screens. They were not informed about the identity 6 
of their partner or the other members of their matching group. In the instructions, the payoff 7 
function (2) was explained in detail and was also displayed as a mathematical function and as a 8 
non-exhaustive payoff table. Additionally, subjects could use a calculator during the experiment, 9 
which allowed them to enter hypothetical numbers for their own and their partner’s decision 10 
and calculate the resulting payoff. Before starting the experiment, subjects had to answer ques-11 
tions about the game’s procedures and in particular how the payoffs were determined. We had 12 
three reasons for implementing this quiz. First, we wanted to make sure that the subjects under-13 
stood how their payoff would be determined. Second, we wanted to alert the subjects to the fact 14 
that neither the number Z nor the signals would affect their payoff, and third, the quiz also en-15 
sured that the subjects could clarify any last-minute questions and gain confidence that the other 16 
players understood the game. For instance, in Treatments P75 and P95, the relevant statement 17 
was: “Your payoff in a period depends on a) the number Z, b) the distance between your chosen 18 
number and the number chosen by your partner, or c) your private hint X.” Subjects had to indi-19 
cate the right statement and if their answer was not correct, the experimenter once again ex-20 
plained the payoff function to make clear that it only depends on the distance between one’s 21 
chosen number and the number chosen by the partner. The full set of questions can be found in 22 
Appendix E. Once all subjects had answered the questions correctly, the experiment started.  23 
We ran a total of 17 sessions with 18 subjects in each session, except for three sessions of 24 
Treatment N that had only 12 subjects. The sessions took place between July 2008 and Decem-25 
ber 2009 at the Technical University Berlin. We ran two sessions for N and one session for P75 26 
in February 2012 to have six independent observations for both treatments. In total 288 stu-27 
dents, mainly undergraduate majors from various fields (engineering, business administration, 28 
mathematics, chemistry, etc.) participated. They were recruited through the online recruitment 29 
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiments were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 30 
2007). At the end of a session, we determined the subjects’ earnings by randomly selecting 10 31 
out of the 80 periods for payment. This was done to have sufficient incentives for adjusting 32 
strategies and still avoiding the relevance of risk aversion. The subjects were then paid in pri-33 
vate, where the points earned in the selected periods were converted to euros (1 point = 1 euro 34 
cent). In addition subjects received a fee of 3 euros for showing up. A session lasted about one 35 
hour and the subjects on average earned 21 euros. 36 
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Appendix E: Sample Instructions for Treatment CP - For Online Publi-
cation 
The experiment in which you are participating is part of a research project. Its aim is to analyze 
economic decision behavior. 
The experiment consists of 80 periods in total. The rules and instructions are the same for all 
participants. In each period, you have to make a decision. All periods are completely independ-
ent. Your income from the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions made by the 
other participants. Please read all instructions carefully and thoroughly. 
Please note that you are not permitted to speak to the other participants or to exchange 
information with them for the duration of the entire experiment. Should you have a ques-
tion, please raise your hand, and we will come to you and answer your question. Please do 
not ask your question(s) in a loud voice. Should you breach these rules, we will be forced 
to exclude you from the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw 10 of the 80 periods, which will 
become relevant for your payoff. Your payoff will then be determined according to the sum of 
your earnings from these selected periods. In addition, you will receive 3 Euro for participating 
in the experiment. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, three groups of six participants each are randomly and 
anonymously formed. These groups remain unaltered for the entire experiment. At no point are 
you told who is in your group. 
In each period, you are randomly and anonymously paired with another participant from 
your group (referred to as your partner from now on). This means that you can be paired 
with the same participant from your group several times in the course of the experiment, albeit 
not in two successive periods. Neither you nor your partner is told the other’s identity. 
 
1. Information at the Beginning of Each Period 
 
At the beginning of each period, the computer randomly draws a number Z. The number Z is 
equally likely either to have the value 0 or 100. This means that in 5 out of 10 cases, on average, 
the number Z takes the value 0, and in 5 out of 10 cases, it takes the value 100. The number Z is 
the same for you and your partner.  
At the time of the decision, the number Z is not known. Instead, you receive two independent 
hints for the number Z: 
Shared hint Y: 
You and your partner both receive a shared hint Y for the number Z. This hint can be either 0 or 
100 and is randomly determined. With a probability of 75 percent, hint Y has the same value as 
the number Z. With the remaining probability of 25 percent, the hint will have the other value. 
The shared hint is the same for both of you. 
Private hint X: 
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In addition to the shared hint Y, you will receive a private hint X for the number Z. Your partner 
also receives a private hint X.  
The private hint can be either 0 or 100 and is randomly determined. With a probability of 75 
percent, the private hint X has the same value as the number Z. With the remaining probability 
of 25 percent, the private hint X will have the other value.  
Your private hint and the private hint of your partner are independently drawn, i.e., both private 
hints can be different. You are not told which private hint your partner has received, and your 
partner is not told which private hint you have received. 
If the shared and the private hint are the same, the probability of both being correct is 90 per-
cent. In other words, if you have received two similar hints, then in 9 out of 10 cases these corre-
spond to the number Z.  
If the shared and the private hint are different, then both values of the number Z are equally 
probable.  
 
2. Your Decision  
 
In each period, you have to decide on a number between 0 and 100 (incl. 0 and 100). Once you 
have made your decision, you have to click on the OK button on the corresponding computer 
screen. Once all participants have made their binding decisions, a period is finished. 
 
3. Your Earnings 
 
Your earnings depend on how close your decision has come to your partner’s decision. 
Your earnings (in Euro cents) = ( )2   
100
2200 decisionpartner'sYourdecisionYour −− . 
In other words: your earnings in each period are 200 Euro cents at the most. These 200 Euro 
cents are reduced by the distance between your decision and your partner’s decision. 
The distance is squared, so that higher distance leads to a disproportionate loss compared to a 
smaller distance. The closer your decision is to your partner’s decision, the higher your earnings 
are.  
The following table gives you an overview of possible earnings. In this table, only distances in 
steps of 20 are shown. Please note that distances may be any integer between 0 and 100. In the 
table, you can also see that you are able to earn a maximum of 200 Euro cents (top-left field) and 
a minimum of 0 Euro cents (bottom-right field). 






























You have a calculator at your disposal in each period. In order to use the calculator, you can note 
your own decision and test as many of your partner’s decisions as you wish. The calculator then 
calculates your earnings for the relevant data entered. In the first 5 periods, the calculator is 
active for 20 seconds. During this time, you may carry out as many calculations as you wish. Af-
ter that, the calculator becomes inactive and you must make your decision. From the 6th period 
onwards, the calculator is only active for 10 seconds and you can make your decision at once. 
 
 
Information at the End of a Period 
 
At the end of a period, you are given the following information: 
 
• The number Z  
• The shared hint Y 
• Your private hint X 
 
• Your decision 
• Your partner’s decision 
• The discrepancy between your decision and 
your partner’s decision  





1. Is everyone given the same hint X?   
- Yes, everyone is given the same hint X /  
- No, everyone receives his own hint, i.e., your hint X can be different from your partner’s 
hint X. 
2. Is everyone given the same hint Y? 
- Yes, everyone is given the same hint Y 
- No, everyone receives his own hint Y, i.e., your hint Y can be different from your partner’s 
hint Y. 
3. Your earnings in a period depend on ...   
…the distance between your chosen number and your partner’s chosen number  
…the number Z 
…the private hint X 
4. Are you always paired with the same partner?  Yes / No 
5. How many of the 80 periods are randomly chosen by the computer in order to determine 
your earnings?  
 
